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Abstract 
This paper introduces a household model of private investment in storm protection under an 
endogenous risk framework to determine how ex-ante self-protection and ex-post self-insurance 
spending by coastal households to mitigate storm-inflicted damages are affected by the 
availability of public programs and the presence of a mangrove forest.  The theoretical results 
show that ex-ante publicly constructed physical barriers and mangroves are complements to self-
protection but substitutes to self-insurance. However, ex-post public disaster relief and 
rehabilitation programs are substitutes to self-protection but complements to self-insurance. Our 
empirical analysis of coastal households in Bangladesh impacted by Cyclone Sidr reveals partial 
support for crowding out and crowding in effects of public investments and programs. 
Households located in a mangrove protected area invest more in self-protection and less in self-
insurance.  Other controls, such as household socioeconomic characteristics, also influence and 
add a degree of complexity to the relationship.   
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1. Introduction  
Coastal areas with high population densities and widespread poverty are experiencing more 
damage as a result of cyclones and storm surges (IPCC, 2007; World Bank, 2010). For example, 
one of the more exposed areas is coastal Bangladesh, due to its unique geographical and 
geomorphological characteristics that makes it susceptible to frequent and severe storms (IPCC, 
2007; Karim and Mimura, 2008, Dasgupta et al. 2009). In such an unfavorable environment, it is 
becoming increasingly difficult for the government to support enough public initiatives to 
properly protect the vulnerable coastal communities (World Bank, 2010). Poor households in 
these areas are forced to undertake private defensive strategies to insulate themselves against the 
risk of damages from coastal storms. However, these private behavioral responses are likely to 
be influenced by four factors: (1) the household's expectation of natural disaster damages; (2) 
whether the household is protected ex-ante (i.e. before the disaster) by any publicly constructed 
protective barriers and embankments; (3) the household's awareness that ex-post public disaster 
relief and rehabilitation programs are likely to be implemented; and (4) the presence of any 
"natural barriers", such as a mangrove forest, to protect life and property. The purpose of the 
following paper is to explore how these four factors influence the private defensive strategies of 
poor coastal households threatened by the risk of storm damages to their property. 
 
Individuals have the tendency to place a low probability on a future natural disaster occurring, 
even if it is considered to have a high negative consequence (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; 
Camerer and Kunreuther, 1989; Kunreuther et al., 2001). Such lack of concern about impending 
natural disasters might inhibit investment in risk reduction strategies (Brechin, 2003; Norgaard, 
2009; Grothman and Reuswigg, 2006). In addition, individuals tend not to insure themselves 
against natural disaster risks when they believe help will be available from outside sources, 
either via public-sponsored programs or private charities (Browne and Hoyt, 2000; Lewis and 
Nickerson, 1989; Kunreuther and Pauly, 2006). In the disaster insurance literature, this 
phenomenon is referred to as "charity hazard" (Browne and Hoyt, 2000; Raschky and Weck-
Hannemann, 2007). In this paper, we refer to the similar tendency as the crowding out effect, if a 
household partially or fully reduces defensive expenditures because it is better protected by 
publicly constructed dams and embankments that are implemented before a storm event or it is 
aware of likely rise in government spending on disaster relief or coastal rehabilitation programs 
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after a storm occurs. Conversely, if a household increases defensive expenditures due to public 
programs, then this phenomenon is referred as a crowding in effect. 
 
In addition, the private defensive strategies of poor coastal households may be influenced by the 
presence of mangroves and other "natural barriers" to storms. Various studies show that 
mangroves are effective in protecting life and property in coastal areas due to their ability to 
attenuate the waves caused by storm surges ( Alongi, 2008; Barbier et al., 2008; Das and Vincent 
2009; Koch et al., 2009; Wolanski, 2007). As a result, households living in close proximity to 
mangroves might undertake different defensive actions in response to the perceived threat of a 
storm compared to households without such "natural barrier" protection.  
 
Given the possible influence of public programs and mangroves on private defensive strategies 
we explore two key issues in this paper. First, we examine whether public protection programs, 
such as ex-post public disaster relief and rehabilitation programs and ex-ante publicly 
constructed protective barriers, dams, and embankments, lead to less defensive expenditures by 
the household. Second, we determine whether or not the household in close proximity to a 
mangrove forest also results in less defensive expenditures to mitigate storm damages.  
 
In order to examine these issues, we classify a household’s defensive expenditures into two 
categories: (1) self-protection expenditures are actions that decrease the probability of a 
household incurring property damages from a storm event; thus, they are a form of ex-ante 
prevention; and, (2) self-insurance expenditures, a form of ex-post adaptation, are private 
investments in human, physical, and social capital by the households to reduce their losses in the 
event of storm-inflicted damages. For coastal households in Bangladesh, examples of self-
protection include converting a mud-built house to brick, raising the height of the homestead, 
moving the house inside an embankment, taking refuge in a neighbor’s house, and locating 
further away from the shoreline to a safer place. Examples of self-insurance include income 
source diversification, crop and plot diversification, private transfers in terms of remittances and 
charities, reciprocal gift exchanges, and inter-and intra-household income transfers based on 
insurance motives (or informal risk sharing). All these possibilities are directly or indirectly 
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resulting from household private investments in human, physical, and social capital to reduce the 
severity or magnitude of damages to property as a result of a major storm event.   
 
Since the self-protection and self-insurance actions can reduce the probability and severity of 
storm-inflicted damages, the storm surge risk becomes endogenous (Ehrlich and Becker 1972). 
We develop a household model of private investment in storm protection under an endogenous 
risk framework where the representative household chooses the level of self-protection and self-
insurance against cyclone-induced storm surge damage. Although a similar framework has been 
employed to infer a household’s value for health risk changes from pollution and other hazards 
(Agee & Crocker, 1996; Berger et al., 1987; Bresnahan et al., 1987; Harrington & Portney, 
1987; Shogren & Crocker, 1992), our paper is the first to employ this approach in the context of 
a natural disaster risk faced by developing country households, and also to examine the possible 
influence of exogenous factors, such as public programs and a natural protection barrier.  Our 
theoretical model indicates that the influence of public programs on private storm protection 
actions depend on whether they are implemented before any storm occurs or afterwards. The 
model also explicitly shows the possible influence of mangroves on private defensive strategies 
against storm risks. We also identify four types of corner-solution behavioral responses to reduce 
the likelihood and severity of facing monetary losses or damages to property from a major storm 
event. These corner solutions might arise because of a household’s inability to afford private 
storm protection, which may be a realistic outcome for a poor household in a developing 
country. Finally, we examine these influences empirically with a case study based on a survey of 
500 households in southwest coastal Bangladesh that were affected by Cyclone Sidr in 
November 2007.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the household model of private 
investment on storm protection while Section 3 discusses the empirical and econometric 
estimations. Section 4 describes the process of data collection and offers a brief description of 
the study area.  Section 5 reports the results and analyzes them. Section 6 outlines conclusions 
and policy recommendations.   
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2. The Household Model of Private Investment in Storm Protection    
Assume that a representative rural household lives in a coastal area exposed to the threat of a 
severe cyclone-induced storm surge event that could inflict property loss. This storm surge risk 
has two characteristics: (1) the range of possible adverse consequences, and (2) the probability 
distribution across consequences.  In this paper, we measure the adverse effects as monetary 
losses to property in terms of the damages to houses, trees, livestock and poultry, and agricultural 
crops.  To keep the exposition simple, we assume that there is one adverse storm event. Since we 
are interested in the household's defensive actions when it is fully exposed to a storm surge 
event, we do not consider non-storm states.  
 
We assume that a household’s private spending on storm protection can influence its probability 
of experiencing property damage through self-protection, whereas the severity of any damages 
resulting from the storm surge is reduced through self-insurance.  For the sake of simplicity, the 
model does not consider any health-related impacts, such as injury and loss of life as a result of 
the storm event.   
 
The probability of damages to property fully exposed to a storm for representative household i 
located in village j is 
   . ; , ,ij ij ij ij ij ijZ G M C       (1) 
where ijZ  is the level of self-protection expenditures that decrease the probability of facing ex-
post property damages;
1
 ijG  is the household’s access to ex-ante public protection programs, 
such as disaster preparedness programs and publicly constructed embankments or dams that 
reduce the probability that the household incurs flooding damages; ijM  is a vector of 
characteristics capturing the role of mangroves as a natural storm protection barrier, such as the 
area of the nearby mangrove forest, distance between the mangrove forest and the household, 
directional location of the household relative to the coast and the mangroves, etc., and, lastly, ijC  
is a vector of characteristics of a severe cyclone-induced storm surge, such as storm surge height 
and wind velocity,  direction and distance of the cyclone path from the household location, etc. 
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When exposed to a storm, each household faces monetary losses.  We can state this ex-post 
damage to property as 
( ; )ij ij ij ijL L A R       (2) 
where ijA  is the level of self-insurance expenditures that involve actions to reduce the severity of 
ex-post property damage, and ijR  is the household’s access to ex-post public sponsored disaster 
relief and rehabilitation programs.  We expect the severity or magnitude of the property losses to 
decrease if the household invests in self-insurance actions and enjoys accessibility to public-
assistance programs designed specifically to reduce the severity of the event.  
 
The household is assumed to maximize a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility index over wealth 
(consumption). Considering the two possible states of nature, let  1(.)
L
ij ijU U W  denote the 
household utility when the household faces storm-inflicted monetary losses to property and 
1 ( (.))ij ij ij ijW I A Z L    is the net wealth considering the property loss. In 1W , a household’s 
full income is represented by ijI , its level of self-protection expenditures by ijZ , and its level of 
self-insurance expenditures by ijA . On the other hand, let 2(.) ( )
NL
ij ijU U W  denote the household 
utility when it faces no storm damages and 2 ( )ij ij ijW I A Z   is the net wealth. Since we are 
dealing with two possible states of nature as a result of full exposure to a major storm, we 
suggest that storm-inflicted damages lower household utility since a household’s exposure to a 
damaging storm event lower its wealth (consumption) level. This could be interpreted as, 
(.) (.)L NLij ijU U .  Furthermore, we assume that the utility functions are strictly increasing, 
concave, and twice continuously differentiable over wealth (consumption). Given these 
assumptions, the household maximization problem is
2
 
,
( ; , , ) (( ( ; ))
( )
(1 ( ; , , )) (( )
                    
Z A
Z G M C U I A Z L A R
Max E U
Z G M C U I A Z


    
                                 
                
  1 2; , , ( ) (1 ( ; , , )) ( )  Z G M C U W Z G M C U W          (3) 
Expression (3) says that expected utility, which is to be maximized, is the sum of the utilities of 
facing damages and no damages, weighted by their respective probabilities.   
7 
 
 
The first-order conditions with respect to the level of self-insurance and self-protection lead to  
 ' '1 2(.) ( ) 1   ( ) (1 (.))
L
U W U W
A
 
 
       
     (4)
 
  ' '1 2 1 2
(.)
( ) ( )   (.) ( ) (1 (.)) ( )U W U W U W U W
Z

 

       

                (5) 
 
where 1
'( )U W and 2
' )(U W are the marginal utilities of wealth (consumption). Expression (4) 
reveals that a household could employ self-insurance to reduce the severity of storm surge 
damages up to the point where the expected marginal benefits of self-insurance, as defined by the 
net reduction in loss, equal expected marginal costs.  Expression (5) indicates that a household 
could employ self-protection up to the point where the expected marginal benefits of self-
protection, as defined by the decreased chance of storm damages weighted by the utility 
difference between the two states, equal expected marginal costs.  
 
Appendix A shows the full solution to household’s maximization problem based on equation (4).  
We analyze four types of behavioral responses from the household to reduce the likelihood and 
severity of facing storm-induced damages to property: (a) both self-protection and self-insurance, 
i.e. the interior solution of the above model; (b) self-protection only, i.e. a corner solution; (c) 
self-insurance only, i.e. a corner solution; and (d) no self-protection and self-insurance.  
 
For the second-order sufficiency conditions associated with (3), the sign of the cross-partial 
derivatives with respect to self-protection and self-insurance expenditures cannot be determined 
even if the household is considered to be averse to storm risks. We show later in this paper how 
imposing additional restrictions in determining the signs of these cross-partial derivatives plays a 
significant role in determining the key comparative static results.    
 
2.1 Comparative Static Analysis of Self-protection and Self-insurance  
A household’s choice of self-protection and self-insurance to reduce extensive storm-inflicted 
damage is influenced by its access to government protection programs as well as its proximity to 
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mangroves.  We examine these effects through comparative static analysis of the interior solution 
of the model.  The full results are depicted in Appendix B, and they show that we cannot 
determine the directions of the relationships between a household’s private defensive strategies 
and the public programs (both ex-ante and ex-post) unless we impose additional conditions on 
the model. Likewise, the relationship between a household’s private defensive strategies and its 
proximity to mangroves remains ambiguous without additional conditions, which are also shown 
in Appendix B.  
 
The results from the comparative static analysis reveal the following propositions.  
 
PROPOSITION 1: For a risk-averse household, ex-ante government spending on public 
programs G  leads to crowding-in of self-protection Z , i.e. 0
Z
G



 but crowding-out of self-
insurance A , i.e. 0
A
G



.  That is, public protection programs act as a complement to self-
protection but as a substitute to self-insurance. The proof of Proposition 1 depends on Conditions 
1 and 2 (derived in Appendix B), which are,   
Condition 1. 0AZ ZAH H  . That is, assuming self-protection and self-insurance to be stochastic 
substitutes.
3
 This implies that the marginal utility of self-protection, Z , decreases if more self-
insurance, A , activities are taken by the household and vice-versa.    
Condition 2. 
2
(.)
0
G Z


 
. This suggests that more ex-ante government programs, G , can 
accentuate the influence of self-protection, Z , in reducing the probability of facing storm-
inflicted damages to property.  
If either of these conditions is violated, then the signs of 
Z
G


 and 
A
G


 remain ambiguous.    
Supporting evidence for Condition 2 abounds based on the contemporary literature on the 
relationship between public and private investment (Blejer and Khan, 1984; Greene and 
Villanueva, 1991; Erenburg, 1993; Ramirez, 1994, 2000; Oshikoya, 1994; Mitra, 2006). Findings 
by Erenburg (1993) reveal that public infrastructure capital has a stimulating effect on private 
investment in equipment and machinery. Using a panel data on developing economies for 1980 
to 1997, Erden and Holcombe (2005) showed that a 10% increase in public investments lead to a 
9 
 
2% increase in private investments. Blejer and Khan (1984) for a panel of developing countries 
and Oshikoya (1994) for a panel of African countries presented evidence that public 
infrastructure investments has a positive impact on private investment. Kollamparambil and 
Nicolau (2011) study on South Africa found that public investment on infrastructure and social 
sectors is likely to enhance private investment; whereas, Hussain et al. (2004) detected positive 
influence of public development expenditures, such as infrastructure, health and education, on 
private investment based on annual time series data of Pakistan between 1975 and 2008. Mistra 
(2006) and Sterven (2004) also presented evidence of crowding-in over the long run and 
crowding-out over the short run following their research on India. However, all these findings do 
not convincingly show whether public expenditures that lower risks would also increase the 
return on private investments that lower the same risks, we consider the direction of the sign for 
an increase of an ex-ante government spending on the optimum levels of self-protection and self-
insurance is an empirical question. For our research, we consider the positive influence of ex-
ante government spending on public programs on infrastructures such as roads and embankments 
on private self-protection expenditures.  
 
PROPOSITION 2: For a risk-averse household, it is not possible to determine the direction of 
the influence of ex-post public-assisted disaster relief and rehabilitation programs on ex-ante 
self-protection and self-insurance. However, for a risk-neutral household and with some 
additional restrictions, self-protection Z  declines (i.e., becomes a substitute) but self-insurance 
A  increases (i.e., becomes a complement) if households have more access to ex-post public-
assisted disaster relief and rehabilitation programs R , i.e. 0 and 0
Z A
R R
 
 
 
. The proof of 
Proposition 3 for a risk-neutral household depends on Conditions 3-5. 
Condition 3.   The probability of facing ex-post storm inflicted property damages, (.) , is 
strictly quasi-convex with respect to self-protection expenditure, Z : 
2
2
(.) (.)
0; 0.
Z Z
  
 
 
 This 
implies that the probability of facing monetary losses to property as a result of a cyclone induced 
storm surge decreases for a household if it invests more in self-protection expenditure.  
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Condition 4. A strict quasi-convex relationship exists between storm-inflicted monetary losses 
to property and self-insurance expenditures,
2
2
 0 ;  0
L L
A A
 
 
 
. This means that monetary losses to 
property decrease as a household commits more self-insurance expenditure. 
Condition 5. 
2 (.)
0.
L
R A


 
 Condition 5 states that more ex-post public-assisted disaster relief and 
rehabilitation programs, R , accentuate the effect of self-insurance in reducing monetary loss or 
damages to property as a result of a severe storm event.   
 
Conditions 3 and 4 are self-explanatory. However, Condition 5 requires justifications and 
supporting evidence. Condition 5 proposes that access to more ex-post public disaster relief and 
rehabilitation programs can further accentuates the effectiveness of self-insurance in reducing 
storm-inflicted monetary loss or damages to property. Based on empirical findings on twelve 
(12) low-and middle-incomes countries that encountered economic crises and natural disasters, 
Skoufias (2003) highlighted some ex-post public strategies that can be more effective in 
protecting households from adverse aggregate shocks. Baez and Mason (2008) suggests how ex-
post public complimentary policies through education, training, and critical information after a 
natural disaster event in Latin American countries can empower households with  characteristics 
that enhance their capacity to diversify their income and crop portfolios.  Following our 
theoretical model, these outcomes do assume that the household is risk neutral. The behavioral 
response of risk-averse households is much more difficult to discern. Hence, further 
understanding of the possible direction of the sign requires empirical analysis.       
 
PROPOSITION 3: For a risk-averse household, the storm protection services of mangrove 
forests M
 
increases the household’s self-protection Z , i.e., 0
Z
M



, but decreases self-insurance 
A , i.e. 0
A
M



. That is, storm protection provided by mangroves acts as a complement to self-
protection but as a substitute to self-insurance.  
 
The proof and results of Proposition 3 rely on Condition 1 and Condition 6 in Appendix B.  
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Condition 6.
 
2
(.)
0
M Z


 
. This condition states that more storm protection from mangroves, M , 
accentuates the influence of self-protection, Z , in reducing the probability of facing damages to 
property conditional on the storm event. 
 
One possible explanation for Condition 6 is the ecological rationality assumption which relies on 
how individuals develop adaptive behavior against positive or negative outcomes of an event by 
forming simple heuristics based on their past experiences, patterns of available information, or 
repeated exposure associated with that event (Smith, 2003; Todd and Gigerenzer, 2007). Using 
the ecological rationality assumption, one can argue that a poor coastal household might be 
forced to allocate more for self-protection to reduce their likelihood of facing storm-inflicted 
damages if there is uncertainty regarding whether mangroves can actually protect their properties 
against major storms. This could be further fuelled by the possibility of households protected by 
mangroves having lower expectations of receiving ex-post public-assistance programs, since 
they are presumed to cope better from major storms. However, such interpretations cannot be 
justified considering the theoretical setup of our model.  The direction of the sign of the effect of 
more storm protection of mangroves on the optimum levels of self-protection is an empirical 
question. On the other hand, the negative relationship between increasing storm protection 
capacities of mangroves and private self-insurance among the mangroves-protected households 
is more reasonable.  
 
Table 1 summarizes the comparative statics results with the accompanying conditions.  An 
interesting pattern emerges from these results. Factors that are in place before a storm occurs, 
such as government protection programs and mangroves, are complements to self-protection 
expenditures by the household, whereas these exogenous influences are substitutes for self-
insurance by the household.  The latter effect implies that, if the household is receiving 
protection from mangroves and government spending programs, then it is less likely to have to 
allocate expenditures for ex-post reduction in losses incurred from a storm.  Also, if the 
household is already protected by mangroves and public programs, it can enhance its welfare by 
using complementary self-protection measures to reduce the risk of storm damage even further.  
On the other hand, the increased availability of relief and rehabilitation programs implemented 
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after the storm occurs reduces self-protection by the household but increases its self-insurance.  
If the household expects more post-disaster programs to be implemented, it is less likely to take 
ex-ante actions to reduce the probability of storm damage to its property.  Interestingly, though, 
if more ex-post relief and rehabilitation is available, the household may allocate more 
expenditure to self-insure against damages.  As disaster relief and rehabilitation programs are 
normally community-wide or district-level efforts, such public programs may also spur 
individual households to adopt their own measures to safeguard their income and property after 
the storm. This outcome does assume that the household is risk neutral, however.  The behavioral 
response of, for example, risk-averse households is much more difficult to discern.   
 
3. Empirical Analysis  
Based on the above propositions on the possible influence of public programs and mangrove 
forests on a household’s private self-protection and self-insurance decisions, we formulate four 
hypotheses to be tested empirically:  
 
H1: Expected storm-inflicted damage is an important determinant of a household’s 
participation in and expenditures on private defensive strategies in terms of self-protection 
and self-insurance; 
H2: A household living inside ex-ante publicly constructed embankments invests more in 
self-protection and less in self-insurance activities against expected storm-inflicted damages;  
H3: The presence of ex-post public disaster relief and rehabilitation programs leads a 
household to invest less in self-protection and more in self-insurance activities against 
expected storm-inflicted damages;  
H4: A household living in close proximity to mangroves invests more in self-protection and 
less in self-insurance.   
 
Hypothesis H1 underlies all three propositions, as it suggests that the expectation of facing future 
storm-inflicted damages would encourage a household to employ more private defensive actions. 
Hypotheses H2, H3 and H4 directly follow Propositions 1, 2 and 3 respectively. Hypothesis H1 is 
tested by estimating whether actual property damages have positive relationships with 
households’ participation in self-protection and self-insurance. A positive relationship would 
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confirm that storm-inflicted damage is an important determinant of a household’s defensive 
choices. To test hypotheses H2, H3, and H4, we estimate how a household's self-protection and 
self-insurance spending changes as a result of an increase in access to ex-ante public protective 
spending; an increase in exposure to mangrove forests; and an increase in access to ex-post 
government-sponsored relief and rehabilitation programs.   
 
Based on the extended analysis in Appendix A with interior solutions as well as potential corner 
solutions involving zero expenditures on either self-protection or self-insurance, we can translate 
the four possible types of household’s behavioral responses into a binary decision (0,1) of 
whether a household undertake any private defensive strategies in terms of self-protection and 
self-insurance. For households that decide to participate in self-protection and self-insurance 
actions, they incur additional self-protection and self-insurance expenditures compare to 
households that do not participate in such private storm protection actions. However, if not all 
households participate in self-protection or self-insurance activities, then there will be sample 
selection bias if an OLS regression is applied on households optimal self-protection 
expenditures, *Z , and self-insurance expenditures, *A . This problem arises because it may not be 
possible to make inferences about the determinants of the level of defensive spending for all 
households. Such sample selection bias is especially problematic if a household may not be able 
to allocate resources for defensive actions due to reasons other than its inability to afford such 
actions. Hence, we adopt the Heckman model (Heckman, 1979) as the most appropriate 
econometric approach to overcome such sample selection bias.  
 
Following Heckman (1979), the exact econometric specifications for self-protection and self-
insurance to empirically test our theoretical household model of private investment in storm 
protection are as follows,   
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 
*
*
' '
1 1 1
(i) For Participation equation for self-protection:
          where 1   ,   1,...  ... 6;   (0,1)
    1     if  0
    0    otherwise
(ii) For Outcome equation to level o
Z
k
Z Z
Z
d X X G M R C k N
d d
d
       
 

:
 * ' ' 22 2 2
*
f self-protection,
      Z      where 1    ,   1,...  ... 6;   (0, )
      Z    if  1
      Z 0     if  0
k
Z
Z
X X G M R C k N
Z d
d
        
 
 
:
  (7) 
 
Expression (7) states that a separate set of factors as reflected under the vectors of explanatory 
variables, 
1X  and 2X  influence the household participation decision equation for self-protection 
and the level of self-protection expenditures equation conditional on participation. Similar 
econometric specifications can be determined for self-insurance participation and expenditures.  
 
For robustness checks, we test for the dependency between the error terms of the participation 
and the outcome equations. If the errors are dependent, then the Heckman method should be 
applied; whereas, if the errors are independent, then the two-part model should be considered 
(Cragg, 1971; Manning et al., 1981; Lee and Maddala, 1985; Jones, 1989; Leung and Yu, 1996; 
Puhani, 2000; Madden, 2008). However, Leung and Yu (1996) and Puhani (2000) suggested that 
the two part-model is likely to outperform the Heckman model (1976, 1979) when there exists 
high collinearity between the inverse Mills ratio term and the explanatory variables. Considering 
these additional factors, we estimate both the full information maximum likelihood (FIML) and 
the two-part model, and compare the results. We also employed joint estimation of self-
protection and self-insurance choices using a bivariate probit model, which replicates the 
seemingly unrelated regression estimation (SURE) form as suggested by Zellner (1962). This 
alternative econometric specification is applicable assuming the two defensive strategies of self-
protection and self-insurance of a household are jointly determined.  
 
4. Case Study Area and Survey 
Meteorologists and researchers consider Cyclone Sidr, which made landfall on the south-western 
coastal areas of Bangladesh on 15
th
 November 2007 to be the most severe storm event to strike 
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Bangladesh recently. It had a diameter of nearly 1000 km and sustained wind speed up to 240 km 
per hour accompanied by a maximum tidal surge height of 5.2 meters (or around 17 feet) in some 
affected areas (GOB, 2008). Although early warning systems contributed to successful 
evacuation of the coastal people which resulted in fewer human casualties, there was extensive 
damage to houses, live-stock, crops, and trees. In addition to the government-assisted early 
warning systems installed under the cyclone-preparedness program (CPP), one of the most 
significant factors to contribute to reduced loss of life and property in coastal areas was the 
Sundarban, the world’s largest mangrove forest (UNEP and WCMC, 2008; Iftekhar and Saenger, 
2008).
 4
  
 
Based on the location of Sundarban mangrove forest and the track of the Cyclone Sidr, we 
adopted the following procedure to designate and demarcate the study area: First, we selected an 
area located on the southwest coast of Bangladesh that falls under the high cyclone risk zone.
5
 
Applying Geographic Information Systems (GIS), we followed the track of the Cyclone Sidr and 
the position of the Sundarban mangrove forest in order to identify the areas that would be 
suitable for the analysis (see Fig.1). Using GIS, we identified both the protected (P) and the non-
protected (NP) coastal areas.  We define as “protected” (P) any area that is located behind the 
Sundarban mangrove forest and is located in a clockwise direction from Cyclone Sidr.  
Conversely, we define as “non-protected” (NP) any area that is not located behind the Sundarban 
mangrove forest and is in either a clockwise or counter-clockwise direction from Cyclone Sidr. 
We then applied ‘random area sampling’ to select the unions that fall under protected (P) and 
non-protected (NP) areas.
6
  The unions were chosen based on their location at an equal distance 
on either side along the track of Cyclone Sidr.  
 
Taking into consideration the fact that Bangladesh is most vulnerable to severe cyclone and 
storm surge events during the pre-monsoon (April-June) and post-monsoon (October-November) 
seasons, we conducted the household survey during the post-monsoon season.  Around 500 
households were surveyed from 35 villages in 18 unions using a weighted stratified random 
sampling method.  Out of the 18 unions, 8 unions fall under the protected areas while the rest fall 
under the non-protected areas.  We selected the households randomly from each union based on 
the Bangladesh Population Census Data.   
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We conducted personal interviews with the head of the household using trained enumerators 
speaking the local language under our guidance and employing the questionnaire we developed. 
The questionnaires were pre-tested in October 2008, and the final survey was conducted in 
November, 2008.  Since we conducted the household survey within a year after Cyclone Sidr, we were 
able to obtain information, based on both actual records and recollections of the event, on household 
involvement in private self-protection and self-insurance activities. In addition, we collected 
information on important demographic and socio-economic characteristics of each household. 
We also obtained secondary data on the storm characteristics of Cyclone Sidr and additional 
geophysical information on the Sundarban mangrove forest.  
 
Table 3 reveals the general demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the 500 
households in the two case study areas, where 220 households fall under the protected area (P) 
and the rest fall under the non-protected area.  For the protected areas, males comprised 84.1% of 
the respondents, whereas, for non-protected areas, they accounted for 71.8%.  The average age of 
the respondents was around 42 to 43 years old.  52.1% of the respondents in the protected areas 
had completed primary school education, while it was 45.5% in the non-protected areas.  Less 
than 30% had secondary school education in both areas.  The average household size was five 
members in the protected areas, and six in the non-protected areas, which is approximately the 
national average household size in Bangladesh.  Nearly all the respondents (more than 90%) had 
been living in the same village since birth.  Day labor is the most common occupation (36%) 
among households in the protected areas, and agriculture (40%) in non-protected areas. Business 
activities come second as an occupation in both case study areas representing 13-16% of the 
respondents.  In both areas, most of the households own the houses they live in.  Regarding the 
structure of the house, most house walls are made of wood while the roofs are made of tin or 
corrugated iron sheet.  More than 20 percent of the houses in non-protected areas are two storied; 
whereas, in the protected areas, less than 10 percent of the total houses are two storied.  Less 
than 50 percent of the households in both study areas made any changes to their dwellings to 
reduce exposure to storm surge-inflicted damages although more than half believe that their 
houses face some storm damage risk due to their location at low elevations. Less than one third 
of the households have access to electricity while access to a cell phone use is close to 50%. In 
protected and non-protected areas, most households obtain drinking water from ponds, canals, 
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rivers, and preserved rain water, and in the non-protected areas, households rely on tube-wells, 
ponds, canals, and rivers.   
 
In the survey, self-protection expenditures were designated and measured by adding the 
approximate amount that a household invested to pursue each self-protection action. This 
information was based on a follow-up question to those households who responded affirmatively 
to the earlier question regarding whether they had pursued any self-protection actions to avoid 
Cyclone Sidr-inflicted damages to their property. The average amount spent on self-protection in 
the protected area was US $1,825 per household; whereas, in the non-protected areas it was US 
$768 per household. On the other hand, we could not directly determine the level of self-
insurance expenditures due to data limitations in identifying all types of self-insurance except for 
private inward remittances. Besides remittances, in the survey, approximate self-insurance 
expenditures are determined by also taking into account the medical expenditures associated with 
the Cyclone Sidr-inflicted health damages since such expenses could be supported by informal 
risk sharing mechanism through inter-and intra-household income transfers as part of economic 
resilience against a future natural disaster risk event. Following the endogenous risk literature, 
setting asides funds for medicines, certain foods, and medical check-ups can reduce a 
household’s vulnerability of illness against a harmful event and hence, such redistribution of 
income towards less favorable states could be treated as a form of self-insurance (Ehrlich and 
Becker, 1972; Gruber and Yellowitz, 1999; Nyman, 1999). Considering the abject poverty and 
limited insurance markets facing the Bangladesh coastal communities, self-insurance in the form 
of redistribution of income to reduce property and health losses from a major storm event 
represents a more rationalistic thinking given a household’s level of wealth with precautionary 
savings motives.     
 
Based on the results from our survey, the average expenditure on self-insurance in the protected 
area was US $93 per household, and in the non-protected area, US $407 per household. The 
wealthier households in both areas spend a significant proportion of their income on storm 
protection actions as opposed to the poorer households.  One possible explanation is that the 
wealthier households are willing and able to allocate more for self-protection and self-insurance 
since they expect to incur more storm-inflicted monetary losses to property. Damages from 
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Cyclone Sidr to households in the non-protected areas (US $1,478 per household) were higher 
than for those households located in the protected areas (US $1,327 per household).  
 
Consistent with our theoretical model, not all the households surveyed engaged in defensive 
actions against storms. Among the households, only 22% participated in self-protection and 23% 
households in self-insurance. Only 8.87% applied both self-protection and self-insurance. Of the 
496 households surveyed, 13% participated in only self-protection activities, 14% in only self-
insurance activities, and 9% in both activities. In the protected areas, of the 216 households, 13% 
participated in only self-protection activities, 12% in only self-insurance, and 16% in both 
activities. In the non-protected areas, of the 280 households, 13% participated in only self-
protection activities, 16% in only self-insurance, and 4% in both activities. Average household 
income (US $1,005) and the average land area (5,261 hectares) were lowest for households not 
participating in any self-protection and self-insurance activities. However, both average 
household income (US $1,182) and the average land area (8,053 hectares) were largest for 
households participated in both self-protection and self-insurance activities.  
 
In terms of accessibility to public protection programs, 82% of the households in the non-
protected areas live inside an embankment while only 35% of the households in protected areas 
live inside an embankment. Similarly, 62% of households in the non-protected areas live close to 
a cyclone shelter, and 44 % in the case of households in the protected areas. Thus, households in 
the non-protected areas appear to have more access to publicly funded protection facilities 
compared to households in the protected areas. Regarding public programs for disaster relief and 
rehabilitation, households in both areas had equal access to relief programs, although households 
in the protected area had better access to rehabilitation programs.  
 
5. Estimation Results and Discussion  
Our empirical analysis is based on the full sample of the household survey. Table 3 shows the 
summary statistics for the explanatory variables used in our regression. Tables 4 and 5 present 
the results of the full information maximum likelihood (FIML) of the full sample selection model 
for self-protection.
7
  Table 4 displays various estimations of the selection equation of the 
probability of a household participating in self-protection activities, and Table 5 shows the  
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results from the corresponding outcome equation for the effects on the level of self-protection 
expenditures conditional on participation. Both tables report four regression specifications 
starting with a basic model (regression 1), which include as explanatory variables damages 
inflicted by Cyclone Sidr, pre-Cyclone Sidr household income, distance from the coast, asset 
holdings based on ownership of homestead, cropland, and pond area, and other socio-economic 
characteristics.
8
 For the other regression specifications, additional controls are progressively 
added starting with mangroves characteristics (regression 2), then, public programs (regression 
3), and finally, the storm characteristics of Cyclone Sidr (regression 4).  
 
Following the concepts of ecological rationality (Smith, 2003; Todd and Gigerenzer, 2007), We 
assume that households with previous encounters of damaging storm events has led to them 
subsequently invest a portion of their time and money to insulate them against future storm-
inflicted damage. In addition, households’ current level of income can also influence their 
preference to locate in coastal areas that are not protected by mangroves but these areas are more 
likely to receive relief from government because they represent poorer and easily accessible 
communes. To deal with the exogenous sources of variations on household’s location 
preferences, we included in our estimation analysis a variable that captures households’ location 
preferences based on their previous experiences with major storm events.  
To control for exogenous sources of variations on households’ behavioral responses to public 
relief, we applied a household’s access to electricity and access to phone as instruments. This is 
motivated by following the literature on the political economy of government responsiveness to 
natural calamities which shows that the likelihood of receiving aid from the government is higher 
if the affected communities possess higher radio coverage, have stronger political support for the 
incumbent government, and easier accessible network (Besley & Burgess, 2000, 2002; Franchen 
et al. 2012).   
The regression results suggest that storm-inflicted damage is an important determinant of 
households’ participation in ex-ante self-protection. The coefficient for the damage variable is 
positive and highly significant in all regression specifications. Although not highly significant in 
the full regression model (4), the coefficients for the log and the square of the log of a 
household’s pre-Cyclone Sidr income display positive and negative signs respectively under all 
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specifications. This suggests that the probability of a household participating in ex-ante self-
protection activities has an inverted U-shaped relationship with income, initially increasing, but 
then declining. Hence, it is more likely that a middle-income household will pursue self-
protection compared to a poor or wealthy household. The coefficient of ownership of homestead, 
cropland, and pond area--a proxy for the household’s asset holding--remains positive and 
significant throughout. Results also show that a household is more likely to participate in self-
protection if it has fewer children and has less access to credit compared to other households. 
However, a household is less likely to participate in self-protection if it plans to migrate in the 
future. The elevation of the surrounding area is rarely significant in explaining the decision of the 
household to undertake self-protection.  The directional distance between the household and the 
track of the Cyclone Sidr has a positive influence on a household undertaking self-protection, 
although these actions are less likely if the households fall into counter-clockwise direction from 
the storm. 
 
With regard to the role of mangroves, regression 2 indicates that a household in a protected area 
is more likely to participate in self-protection, though this influence turns out to be insignificant 
when other controls like public programs and storm characteristics are progressively added to the 
model.  On the other hand, the location of the household with respect to the coast and the 
mangroves may possibly affect the household’s participation in self-protection.  Although the 
coefficient for MDIR is statistically significant only at the 10% level in regressions 2 and 4, this 
result suggests that a household located to the south and southwest direction relative to the coast 
and the Sundarban mangrove forest is less likely to participate in self-protection compared to a 
household that is oriented differently.  Since location relative to the Sundarban mangrove forest 
may determine how well the household is protected by this natural barrier, a household that faces 
in a less favorable direction may be compelled to undertake more self-protection actions. 
Similarly, results for regression 4 show that the distance between the mangrove forest and the 
union where the household’s village is located has a negative and significant relationship with 
self-protection, again suggesting that close proximity to a natural storm protection barrier may 
reduce the need for self-protection.  Whether or not a household is protected by an embankment 
appears to have no statistically significant impact on whether it is more likely to participate in 
self-protection. Ex-post public disaster relief leads to households participating less in self-
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protection activities although this effect is not significant at the 10% level. Regression 3 
indicates that the presence of public disaster rehabilitation leads a household to undertake self-
protection, but this influence is insignificant when storm characteristics are added to the model.  
 
Table 5 reports the results of the outcome equation for self-protection expenditures conditional 
on participation. The results confirm H1 that storm-inflicted damage is an important determinant 
of a household’s level investment in self-protection. The coefficients for the log and the square 
of the log of pre-Cyclone Sidr income are strongly significant in all regression specifications, 
with negative and positive signs respectively. That is, conditional on participation, a household’s 
level of self-protection expenditures exhibits a U-shaped relationship with income, initially 
declining, but then increasing.  Once a household decides to participate, if it is poor or rich, it is 
likely to spend more on self-protection activities compared to middle-income households. The 
results in Table 5 indicate that a household invests more in self-protection if it has access to 
credit but invests less if it is a member of any village-level organization, and if its house is 
located in higher elevations. A household located in a protected area invests more in self-
protection, implying that H4 cannot be rejected. However, the coefficients of the other mangrove 
variables such as location of the household with respect to the mangrove and its distance to the 
nearest forest are not statistically significant. A Household located inside an embankment invests 
more in self-protection, which suggests that H2 cannot be rejected. However, public disaster 
relief and rehabilitation programs do not appear to have a statistically significant influence on a 
household’s self-protection spending.9   
 
Table 6 shows the estimation results for self-insurance.  Due to data limitations on determining 
the level of self-insurance expenditures, we cannot estimate both the FIML estimator and the 
two-part model. Instead, we estimate separate regressions for the decision to participate in self-
insurance by performing Probit estimation and a separate Tobit estimation to deal with the 
censored nature of the self-insurance expenditures. In addition, the estimations include a 
household’s income before Cyclone Sidr and after. Because self-insurance actions take place 
once a disaster occurs, a household’s income can vary significantly between what it was before 
and after a major storm event. For instance, while a household’s pre-cyclone income might have 
come from subsistence agriculture, its post-cyclone income might come from day labor because 
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the agriculture crops have been destroyed as a result of the cyclone. Our results show that there is 
low correlation either between the log of pre-income and log of post-income or between the 
square log of pre-income and the square log of post-income. These correlation outcomes along 
with the t-tests confirm the difference between the sources of income before and after the 
Cyclone Sidr event.    
 
The Probit estimation in Table 6 reveals that self-insurance is also an important private defensive 
strategy against storm-inflicted damages, and damages are an important determinant of a 
household’s participation in self-insurance. The coefficient for a household living inside an 
embankment has a negative sign and significant only at the 10 % level although this effect 
disappears in regression 4. However, the coefficients of both ex-post public disaster relief and 
rehabilitation programs are positive and highly significant, which implies that the probability of a 
household participating in self-insurance increases if the household has more access to these 
programs. The coefficient for a household living within the mangrove protected area has a 
negative sign and is statistically significant. This suggests that a household living in such an area 
is less likely to undertake self-insurance. On the other hand, households located close to the 
mangroves are more likely to participate in self-insurance. Among the socio-economic controls, 
a household is more likely to participate in self-insurance if it has more children whereas it is 
less likely to participate if it is a member of a village-level organization. A household is also 
more likely to participate in self-insurance if it is located further away from the coast. None of 
the income variables have a significant influence on the probability of self-insurance. This might 
imply that other factors rather than income play a major role on household’s choice to undertake 
self-insurance. Finally, none of the storm characteristic variables are strongly significant in the 
regressions for participation in self-insurance.   
 
Table 6 also shows the censored Tobit model results for estimating the level of self-insurance 
expenditures of the households, starting with the basic model (column 6-9). The results confirm 
H1 that storm-inflicted damage is an important factor in the household’s level of self-insurance 
investment. Under all specifications, the coefficient of the nominal value of storm-inflicted 
property damages remains positive and highly significant. The coefficients of the log and square 
log of post-Cyclone Sidr income (i.e., household income after Cyclone Sidr) are highly 
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significant with negative and positive signs respectively. That is, a household’s self-insurance 
expenditures exhibit a significant U-shaped relationship with post- Cyclone Sidr income, initially 
declining, but then increasing.  This suggests that low-and high-income households allocate more 
for self-insurance compared to middle-income households. For the socio-economic 
characteristics, the coefficient on age and years of education has a positive sign and is significant 
at the 5 percent level.  These outcomes suggest that if the head of the household is older and 
possesses a higher level of education in terms of more education years, then the household 
invests more in self-insurance. In addition, households invest more in self-insurance if they have 
more children and their houses are located in lower elevations. None of the storm characteristic 
variables are strongly significant in the regressions for investment in self-insurance. Households 
within mangrove protected areas invest less in self-insurance. This finding cannot reject the H4 
that close proximity to mangroves causes households to invest less in self-insurance. Households 
living further away from mangroves also invest less in self-insurance. The direction that the 
household faces with respect to the mangroves appears to have no influence on its self-insurance 
expenditure. Regarding public programs, a household located inside an embankment invests 
more in self-insurance. Thus, this result rejects H2. However, access to public disaster relief and 
rehabilitation programs do not affect household self-insurance spending since they are not 
statistically significant.  
 
To check the results for robustness, we also examined whether a household’s self-protection and 
self-insurance choices are treated as joint rather than separate decisions. The joint estimation of 
the two private storm protection strategies is based on a bivariate probit model applying a 
seemingly unrelated regression (SUR). Using two separate columns for each of the four 
regression specifications, Table 7 reports the joint estimation results. A Lagrange multiplier test 
is performed to see whether the probit models can be estimated separately. The null hypothesis 
of separate estimations of the probit models of self-protection and self-insurance is rejected at 
5% level for the basic model and the regression with mangrove variables only.  However, the 
null hypothesis can only be rejected at the 10% level when public programs and the storm 
characteristics are progressively added to the model. However, we cannot perform joint 
estimation on either the conditional outcome equation for self-protection (see Table 5) or the 
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Tobit regression for self-insurance (see Table 6) as there  are  not  enough  data  points  for  the  
level of self-protection  and  self-insurance expenditures.  
 
In addition, Table 7 indicates that most of the results from the previous analysis hold when the 
joint estimation of the seemingly bivariate probit model is performed. Although there is evidence 
of an inverted U-shaped relationship between income and private storm protection choices, only 
the log and square of the log of a household’s pre-cyclone income for self-protection are 
statistically significant. However, this latter effect disappears in regression 4 with storm surge 
characteristics included. The coefficient of ownership of homestead, cropland, and pond area – a 
form of assets holding – remains positive for both private storm protection choices. But it is 
highly significant throughout only for self-protection. Regarding the role of mangroves and 
public programs, joint estimation leads to same findings when we performed separate 
estimations of the probability of a household participating in self-protection and self-insurance 
choices in Table 5 and Table 7.    
 
To summarize, our empirical results indicate that: (i) storm-inflicted damage is an important 
determinant of a household’s decision to undertake self-protection and self-insurance; (ii) a 
household protected by an embankment invests more in both self-protection and self-insurance; 
(iii) public disaster relief and rehabilitation programs have no impact on self-protection or self-
insurance expenditures of a household; (iv) a household located in a mangrove protected area 
invests more in self-protection and less in self-insurance, and a household further away from the 
forest spends less on self-insurance, but the location of the household with respect to the forest is 
inconclusive; (v) Income has a strong influence on a household’s investment in self-protection 
and self-insurance; and finally, (vi) other socio-economic, demographic, and geo-physical factors 
seem to have considerable influence and add a degree of complexity to the defensive strategies 
of households.  
 
6. Conclusion   
This paper seeks to understand two key issues that influence the way coastal communities protect 
themselves from the increasing frequency and severity of global climate change induced 
cyclones and storm surges. First, our analysis aims to determine whether public protection 
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programs, such as ex-post public disaster relief and rehabilitation programs and ex-ante publicly 
constructed embankments, have the potential to partially or fully crowd out private storm 
protection actions by poor coastal households threatened by a damaging storm. Second, we also 
seek to determine whether living in close proximity to a natural storm protection barrier, such as 
mangrove forests, lessens private storm protection actions of households. 
 
In order to examine these two issues, we introduced a theoretical model using an endogenous 
risk framework to determine possible influence of government programs and mangroves on a 
household’s decision to invest in self-protection and self-insurance. Our theoretical model 
identifies four types of behavioral responses based on both interior as well as possible corner 
solutions to reduce the likelihood and severity of facing monetary losses or damages to property 
from a major storm event. The corner solutions might arise because of a household’s inability to 
afford private storm protection, which may be a realistic outcome for a poor household in a 
developing country. Results following the comparative statics analysis that the influence of 
public programs depend on whether they are implemented before any storm occurs or afterwards. 
Ex-ante publicly constructed protective barriers, embankments or dams that reduce the 
probability of flooding from storm surges are complements to self-protection expenditures but 
substitutes to self-insurance. One possible explanation is that, because a household is better 
protected by such physical structures, it knows that less self-insurance expense are required to 
mitigate any damages resulting from a subsequent storm.  Thus, dams, embankments and 
protective barriers that the government builds before the storm tends to crowd out the self-
insurance expenditures of a household.  On the other hand, the household may also determine 
that the probability of it being inflicted by storm damages will be reduced even further if it also 
undertakes its own self-protection activities before the storm occurs. Hence, the result of ex-ante 
public construction of protective barriers may crowd in complementary investments in self-
protection by the protected household.  
 
In contrast, ex-post public programs that are implemented after a storm event, such as public 
disaster relief and rehabilitation programs are substitutes to self-protection but complements to 
self-insurance.  If a household knows that such relief and rehabilitation programs are available 
after the storm, then it may decide to allocate less expenditure to its own ex-ante self-protection 
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measures and thus have more funds available for self-insurance that complements the ex-post 
government efforts. Consequently, public disaster relief and rehabilitation programs might crowd 
out private self-protection but crowd in self-insurance by a household. However, our empirical 
analysis of coastal households in Bangladesh impacted by Cyclone Sidr finds only partial 
support for some of these crowding in and crowding out effects of public investments and 
programs. A household protected by a publicly constructed embankment built before the storm 
invests more in both self-protection and self-insurance. In contrast, ex-post public disaster relief 
and rehabilitation programs have no impact on self-protection or self-insurance spending by a 
household.  
 
Our theoretical model also explicitly shows the possible influence of mangroves on private 
defensive strategies against storm risks. Households protected by mangroves pursue more self-
protection but less self-insurance. The likely explanation for this effect is similar to that for a 
publicly constructed embankment, dam or other protective barrier.  Because the household 
knows it is better protected by a nearby mangrove forest, it needs to spend less on self-insurance 
for damages inflicted by a storm. On the other hand, the presence of a natural barrier may 
encourage the household to invest more in self-protection to reduce even further the risks of 
storm damage to its home and other property. We conduct an empirical investigation employing 
household survey data to explore this possible influence of mangroves on private storm 
protection, which is a novel contribution of this paper to the literature.
10
 A household located in 
an area protected by mangroves invests more in self-protection and less in self-insurance.  
Although a household located further away from mangroves invests less in self-insurance, there 
is no corresponding influence on self-protection expenditures.  The location of the household 
with respect to the mangrove forest does not appear to influence either self-protection or self-
insurance expenditure.      
 
We tested the key hypotheses resulting from the model based on data obtained from a household 
survey of 35 villages comprising 500 households in the southwest coastal areas of Bangladesh 
affected by Cyclone Sidr in November 2007. Our estimation results indicate that storm-inflicted 
damage is an important determinant of households’ decision to undertake self-protection and 
self-insurance.  A household living inside an ex-ante publicly constructed embankment invests 
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more in self-protection and in self-insurance. However, the household’s awareness that ex-post 
public disaster relief and rehabilitation programs are likely to be implemented has no impact on 
self-protection and self-insurance spending. Our results also show that a household protected by 
mangroves invests more in self-protection and less in self-insurance. A household located further 
away from the mangroves invests less in self-insurance, although there is no corresponding 
influence on self-protection expenditures. The location of the household with respect to the 
mangrove forest has no influence on either self-protection or self-insurance. Household 
characteristics, such as income access to credit,  the age and education of the head of the 
household, and if the house is located in higher elevations, also influence defensive expenditures. 
On the other hand, none of the storm characteristics variables have significant influence on 
household self-protection and self-insurance investment.   
 
Regarding policy implications, our empirical results support efforts by a government to invest 
public protection programs that are implemented before a storm occurs since they encourage 
more investment in self-protection and self-insurance by the coastal households. Besides 
implementing ex-ante publicly constructed embankments or other protective barriers, a 
government could also disseminate knowledge through public led disaster preparedness and 
educational programs to encourage adoption of more private storm protection actions. By 
encouraging the coastal communities to pursue private storm protection strategies in conjunction 
with ex-ante public programs, government can discourage ‘relief dependency’ among the coastal 
households after a storm occurs. As a result, government can make its ex-post disaster relief and 
rehabilitation programs more efficient as well as effective in reducing storm-induced damages 
among coastal households. 
 
As our results also indicate that households in mangrove protected areas invest more in self-
protection but less in self-insurance, a government could also encourage mangrove plantation 
combined with publicly constructed embankments as part of its ex-ante public storm protection 
programs. However, government should avoid planting mangroves in inappropriate 
environmental settings which might reduce long-term ecological sustainability of a coastal area, 
as found in Sri Lanka (Feagin et al., 2009) and Thailand (Barbier 2007 and 2008). In addition, 
policies could promote plantation of trees other than mangroves, as evidence from coastal 
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Bangladesh reveals that dense plantation of coconuts, beetle nuts, and banana trees around the 
house can also provide some protection against storm damages (Paul and Routray, 2010).  
 
Policies that help diversify post-storm household income would also enhance the ability of 
households to cope with storm-inflicted damages to their property. In addition, government can 
earmark more funds under its ex-post disaster relief and rehabilitation programs for the 
households with more elderly and children members as well as that are located in lower 
elevations. Since our results indicate that these types of households invest more in self-insurance, 
such program can create more incentives for these households by subsidizing their self-insurance 
investment. Conversely, government can ease regulations for financial institutions and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) by lending credit to the households that are willing to invest 
in self-protection because our results show that households invest more in self-protection if they 
have better access to credit.    
 
With uncertainties surrounding the wave attenuation capacity of mangroves from tidal waves that 
are too extreme in magnitude (Alongi, 2008; Wolanski, 2007; Cochard et al., 2008) and the 
government’s own capacity to protect the coastal communities from intense storm events (The 
World Bank, 2010), it is justifiable for the government to encourage more collective and 
individual participation in private storm protection actions in both mangrove protected and non-
mangroves protected areas. The government should also ensure that these programs are 
sustainable in the long run taking into account the widespread poverty and limited insurance 
markets facing the Bangladesh coastal communities.  
 
Appendix A 
Given the expressions (1)-(3), the household optimization framework with non-negative 
inequality constraints is,
11
  
 
        
, ,
; , , 1 ; , ,L NL
Z A X
Max EU Z G M C U X Z G M C U X         
subject to  
( ; )    (income constraint)      
0                            (composite good consumption constraint)
0                             (self-protection constraint)
0                         
X Z A L A R I
X
Z
A
   


     (Self-insurance constraint)
                          (A.1) 
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Given the problem, the Lagrangian function is, 
          
 
, , , ; , , 1 ; , ,
                                         + ;
L NLZ A X Z G M C U X Z G M C U X
I X Z A L A R
  

      
      
L
   (A.2) 
The first-order Kuhn-Tucker conditions are 
 :    0
         0
         0
L NLZ U U
Z Z
Z
Z
Z


 
   
 

 


L
L       
 (A.3) 
 
:    1 0
         0
         0
A
A A
A
A
A

    
         

 


L L
L       (A.4) 
 
 :    1 0
         0
         0
L NLU U
X
X X X
X
X
X
  
  
      
  

 


L
L       (A.5) 
     
:    ( ; ) 0
         0
         0
I X Z A L A R





     


 


L
L
      (A.6) 
 
 
Starting with expression (A.5), assuming a representative household has positive consumption of 
the composite good, i.e. 0X  ,    
 
 
0   
(.) 1 (.)L NLX X
X
U U  



     
L
                                      (A.7) 
 
Expression (A.7) reveals that a household will prefer to have positive consumption of composite 
good if the expected marginal benefit from consuming the composite good under both states of 
the world, i.e. adverse and non-adverse states, is equivalent to its shadow price. The shadow 
prices of the composite good X can also be expressed as the marginal imputed cost (opportunity 
cost) of consuming the good or the expected marginal utility of income.       
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Considering a household will exhaust its budget, which is equivalent to say 0   and 0




L  
from expression (A.6), we will now proceed with our discussion on the four types of household 
behavioral responses to reduce the likelihood and the severity of experiencing damages to 
property from a major storm. For all types, we assume that a household will always tends to 
consume the composite good at least at the subsistence level, i.e. 0X X .     
 
Type (a): Interior Solution of Both Self-protection and Self-insurance  
From (A.3), if 0Z  , then the first order condition with respect to Z  is an unconstrained 
maximum of the Lagrangian.  
 0    L NLU U
Z Z


 
    
 
L
                
(A.9) 
Expression (A.9) implies that a household will pursue self-protection up to the point where the 
expected marginal benefit of self-protection is equal to its expected marginal imputed cost 
(opportunity cost) or the expected marginal utility of income. The latter can also be identified as 
the shadow price or virtual price of self-protection.  
 
Similarly, from (A.4), if 0A  , then, 
0     1 0
L
A A

    
          
L
                  (A.10) 
Since 0  , we can infer from expression (A.10) and by re-arranging terms,   
1
L
A



                                                                                     (A.10.1) 
Expression (A.10.1) suggests that a household could pursue self-insurance strategies if the 
marginal benefit of self-insurance, as defined by the averted monetary loss to damages to 
property, is equal to its marginal cost. The latter can be characterized as the unit cost of self-
insurance based on our simplification that the price of the self-insurance is $ 1. 
 
Thus, given certain assumptions about a household’s utility in states of damage or no damage 
and its level of composite good consumption, expressions (A.9) and (A.10.1) ensure that an 
interior solution exists for a household that where it allocates resources both for self-protection 
and self-insurance.    
 
Type (b):  Self-protection only corner solution 
For the corner solution where the household allocates resources only for self-protection  0Z   
but not for self-insurance  0A  , we have the following based on expression (A.4),  
               
0  1 0
L
A A

    
          
L
                         (A.11) 
But since 0  ,  
1 0     or, 1
L L
A A
    
         
              (A.11.1) 
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Thus, expression (A.11.1) implies that a household will not pursue self-insurance if it considers 
the marginal benefit from self-insurance to be lower than the marginal cost (i.e. the unit cost 
equivalent to price) of self-insurance. 
  
In addition, we consider that condition (A.9) should hold to ensure that a household has positive 
allocation for self-protection  0Z  . Hence, given conditions (A.9) and (A.11.1) under certain 
assumptions, we can express the self-protection only corner solution  00;  0;  and Z A X X   .  
  
Type (c): Self-insurance only corner solution 
In the case of self-insurance only corner solution, it follows from expression (A.3) that we 
should have,  
     0   or, SE NSEU U
Z Z


 
   
 
L
                 (A.12) 
where expression (A.12) indicates that a household will not practice self-protection if and only if 
it perceives that the expected marginal benefit of self-protection is less than or equal to the 
expected marginal imputed costs of self-protection (i.e. the shadow price of self-protection). But 
unlike previously, we will consider that expression (A.10.1) and (A.12) hold to ensure we can 
express the self-insurance only corner solution  00;  0;  and Z A X X   .     
 
Type (d): No self-protection and self-insurance  
For no self-protection and no self-insurance case, we argue that the conditions such as (A.11.1) 
and (A.12) hold so that a household considers that the expected marginal benefits from self-
protection and self-insurance are lower than the expected costs of their take up.  
 
Appendix B 
Proof of PROPOSITION 1. Comparative analyses results show that we cannot determine the 
direction of the relationship between a household’s averting behavior and ex-ante public 
protection spending unless we impose additional restrictions.  
 
Using the first order conditions (4) and (5) of the main paper and the implicit function theorem, 
the comparative static effects of a decrease in G on the optimal levels of self-protection Z   
yields,  
direct effect indirect effect 
*
1
2
 +Z A
AA AZ
Z
ZA ZA
A
AA AA
EMB EMB
H H
Z G G
G H
F EMB
H H
G G
EMBF
H H
G G
H H
 
  
  


 
 
 
    
     
      
6 4 4 7 4 4 8 6 44 7 4 48
 (B.1) 
 
where, 
1
Z
F EMB is the first order condition with respect to self-protection, i.e. the expected 
marginal benefits of self-protection based on expression (4); 2
AF EMB  is the first order 
condition with respect to self-insurance, i.e. the expected marginal benefits of self-insurance 
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based on expression (5); AAH  is the own-partial of self-insurance; and ZAH  is the cross-partial of 
self-protection and self-insurance. Both partials are based on the Hessian matrix ZZ ZA
AZ AA
H H
H
H H
 .  
  
In expression (B.1), the first term in the numerator on the right hand side is the direct effect of 
the ex-ante public spending on self-insurance while the second term is the indirect effect.  
 
Likewise, the comparative static effects of a decrease in G  on the optimal level of self-insurance 
A  yields,  
direct effect indirect effect 
*
1
2
 +A Z
ZZ AZ
Z
ZZ ZZ
A
AZ AZ
EMB EMB
H H
A G G
G H
F EMB
H H
G G
EMBF
H H
G G
H H
 
  
  


 
 
 
    
     
      
6 4 4 7 4 4 8 6 44 7 4 48
 (B.2)  
 
where, 
1
ZF EMB is the first order condition with respect to self-protection, i.e. the expected 
marginal benefits of self-protection based on expression (4); 
2
AF EMB  is the first order condition 
with respect to self-insurance, i.e. the expected marginal benefits of self-insurance based on 
expression (5); AAH  is the own-partial of self-insurance; and ZAH  is the cross-partial of self-
protection and self-insurance. Both partials are based on the Hessian matrix ZZ ZA
AZ AA
H H
H
H H
 .  
 
In expression (B.2), the first term in the numerator on the right hand side is the direct effect of 
the ex-ante public spending on self-protection while the second term is the indirect effect. 
 
Expression (B.1) and (B.2) show that the sign and magnitude of the direct effect depends on how 
a change in ex-ante public spending affects the expected marginal benefits of self-protection 
Z
EMB
G


 
 
 
 and the expected marginal benefits of self-insurance A
EMB
G


 
 
 
.  In addition, it 
depends on the signs of 
ZZ
H and 
AA
H  which are both negative by the second-order conditions.  
Like the direct effect, the indirect depends on the influence of ex-ante public spending on the 
expected marginal benefits of self-protection and self-insurance.  However, it also depends on 
the signs of the cross partials of self-protection and self-insurance ( )
AZ ZA
H H which cannot be 
determined. 
 
Substituting the influence of ex-ante public programs, G , on the expected marginal benefits of 
self-protection, ZEMB
G


, and the expected marginal benefits of self-insurance, AEMB
G


, in 
expression (B.1) leads to  
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        (B.3) 
 
 
Similarly, Substituting the influence of ex-ante public programs, G , on the expected marginal 
benefits of self-protection, ZEMB
G


, and the expected marginal benefits of self-insurance, AEMB
G


, 
in expression (B.2) yields 
          
}
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             (B.4) 
 
It is not possible to sign expression (B.3) and (B.4) unambiguously.  They can only be signed if 
the following conditions hold, 
 
Condition 1. 0AZ ZAH H  . That is, assuming self-protection and self-insurance to be stochastic 
substitutes.
12
 This implies that the marginal utility of ex-ante self-protection, Z , decreases if 
more ex-ante self-insurance, A , activities are taken by the household and vice-versa.   
Condition 2. 
2
(.)
0
G Z


 
. This suggests that more ex-ante government protection activities G
can accentuate the influence of self-protection, Z , in reducing the probability of facing storm-
inflicted damages to property.  
    
Assuming conditions (1) and (2) are met, it is possible to sign - expressions (B.1) and (B.2) 
accordingly. 
  
} }" " " "" " " "
2nd bracketed term 4th bracketed term " " + " "
0AA ZA
H HZ
G H H
  
    
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
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} }" " " "" " " "
2nd bracketed term 4th bracketed term " " + " "
0zz AZ
H HA
G H H
  
    
  

6 4 44 7 4 4 48 6 4 44 7 4 4 48
     (B.5) 
 
Therefore, under additional restrictions, comparative statics result show that ex-ante government 
protection spending, G , is a complement to ex-ante self-protection, Z , but is a substitute to ex-
ante self- insurance, A .  
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Proof of PROPOSITION 2. Starting with the risk-averse case, comparative results on the 
influence of ex-post government risk-reducing programs like disaster relief and rehabilitation 
activities on household averting behavior show that the direction of the relationship can be 
determined only under certain restrictions. Comparative static results show   
direct effect indirect effect 
*
1
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 +Z A
AA AZ
Z
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A
AA AA
EMB EMB
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
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direct effect indirect effect 
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
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  (B.7) 
 
Expressions (B.6)-(B.7) reveal that the sign and magnitude of the direct effects depend on the 
own partials,  and ZZ AAH H , as well as how a change in the ex-post public-assisted disaster relief 
and rehabilitation programs influences expected marginal benefits of self-protection,  Z
EMB
R


, 
and self-insurance, A
EMB
R


. Conversely, the indirect effects depend on the cross partials, 
 and ZA AZH H , and the influence of ex-post public-assisted disaster relief and rehabilitation 
programs on the expected marginal benefit of self-protection and self-insurance.  
 
Under the risk-averse assumption, results reveal that the direction of the relationship between ex-
ante public programs and the private averting strategies remain ambiguous because it is not 
possible to determine the direction of influence of ex-post public programs, R , on the expected 
marginal benefits of self-protection 
Z
ij
EU
EMB
Z



 
 
 
.  However, if the households are assumed to 
be risk neutral, then it is possible to establish the direction of the relationships by imposing the 
additional restriction.  
 
Substituting the influence of ex-post public programs, R , on the expected marginal benefits of 
self-protection, 
ZEMB , and the expected marginal benefits of self-insurance, AEMB , in expressions 
(B.6) and (B.7) lead to,  
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Under the first term of the numerator, the bracketed portion representing 
1
Z
EMB F
R R
 

 
 cannot be 
signed. Therefore, the sign of 
Z
R


 remains ambiguous.   
 
On ex-ante self-insurance, A ,  
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  (B.9) 
It is not possible to sign expression (B.9) unambiguously because we cannot determine the 
directions of the influence of ex-post public assisted relief and rehabilitation program on the 
expected marginal benefit of self-protection 
1
Z
EMB F
R R
 

 
 
 
 
under the indirect effect.  Moreover, 
additional restrictions need to be imposed  to sign the term 
2
L
R A

 
and the cross partial ZAH .   
 
Assuming household to be risk neutral, comparative static results show 
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     (B.11) 
Under the risk neutral case, it is possible to sign both (B.10) and (B.11) if the following 
condition holds:  
 
Condition 3.   The probability of facing ex-post storm inflicted property damages, (.) , is 
strictly quasi-convex with respect to ex-ante self-protection expenditure, Z : 
2
2
(.) (.)
0; 0.
Z Z
  
 
 
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This implies that the probability of facing monetary losses to property as a result of a cyclone 
induced storm surge decreases as household self-protection expenditure increases.  
 
Condition 4. A strict quasi-convex relationship exists between storm-inflicted monetary losses 
to property and ex-ante self-insurance expenditures,
2
2
 0; 0
L L
A A
 
 
 
. This means that monetary 
losses to property decrease as a household commits more self-insurance expenditure. 
Condition 5. 
2 (.)
0.
L
R A


 
 Condition 5 states that more ex-post public-assisted disaster relief and 
rehabilitation programs, R , accentuate the effect of self-insurance in reducing monetary loss or 
damages to property as a result of a severe storm event.  If Conditions (5) along with the other 
conditions hold, then it is possible to sign expression (B.10) and (B.11) indicating the following 
relationship 
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  (B.12) 
 
Expression (B.12) shows that ex-ante self-protection, Z , is expected to go down but ex-ante self-
insurance, A , is expected to go up if households have more access to ex-post government-
assisted disaster relief and rehabilitation programs, R . Consequently, one might observe a 
‘crowding out effect’ on households’ self-protection but a ‘crowding in effect’ of self-insurance 
as a result of an increase in R , assuming the household to be risk neutral.  It is not possible to 
come to a conclusion if the household is risk averse.    
 
Proof of PROPOSITION 3. Comparative analyses could examine the plausible impact of 
mangrove forests as a natural storm protection barrier on household defensive behavior.  The 
initial comparative static results reveal that we require additional restrictions to establish any 
relationship between the two variables.   
 
Comparative static results on the influence of mangrove forests, M , on self-protection, Z , 
reveals  
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6 4 44 7 4 4 48 6 7 8
 (B.13)  
 
Similarly, it is possible to state the influence of M  on ex-ante self-insurance A  as  
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  (B.14) 
 
As before, it is not possible to sign expression (B.13) and (B.14) unambiguously unless we 
impose additional restrictions.  It is possible to sign them using condition 6 (i.e., 0AZ ZAH H  ) as 
well as by introducing the following restriction. 
 
Condition 6.
 
2
(.)
0
M Z


 
. This condition states that more storm protection from mangroves, M , 
accentuates the influence of self-protection, Z , in reducing the probability of facing damages to 
property conditional on the storm event. Condition 6 suggests that the marginal probability of 
facing damages to property conditional on the storm event as a result of self-protection 
expenditures Z  decreases at an increasing rate for an increase in the household’s exposure to the 
storm-protection services of mangrove forests M .     
 
Assuming it is possible to meet conditions (4) and (7), expressions (B.13) and (B.14) show  
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  (B.15) 
 
With additional restrictions, the comparative statics result now demonstrates that exposure to 
greater storm protection services of mangrove forests, M , leads to decrease in a households’ ex -
ante self-protection strategies, Z .  However, it causes an increase in a household’s ex-ante self- 
insurance actions, A .   
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Comparative Static Results of the Household Model of Defensive Strategies 
Ex-ante self-protection ( )Z  
 Conditional  Result Requirements for 
Signing  Conditional 
Result 
Access to ex- ante public 
protection spending 0
dZ
dG
  
2
1.  0
(.)
2. 0
AZ ZAH H
G Z

 


 
 
Exposure to mangrove forest  
0
dZ
dM
  
2
1.  0
(.)
2. 0
AZ ZAH H
M Z

 


 
 
Access to ex-post relief and 
rehabilitation programs  
(Holds only for risk neutral households)
                      0
dZ
dR

 
2 ( , )
0
L A R
R A


 
 
Ex- post self-insurance ( )A  
Access to ex- ante public 
protection spending 0
dA
dG
   
Exposure to mangrove forest  
 
2
1.  0
(.)
2. 0
AZ ZAH H
M Z

 


 
 
Access to ex-post relief and 
rehabilitation programs                            0
(Holds only for risk neutral households)
dA
dR
  
2 ( , )
0
L A R
R A


 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
1.  0
(.)
2. 0
AZ ZAH H
G Z

 


 
0
dA
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
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of Household based on the Study Area 
Household Characteristics Value 
Protected  Non-protected 
Respondent average age (mean) 
Respondent Gender (%) 
 
Literacy rate of Respondent (%) 
 
 
Respondent Occupation (%) 
 
 
 
 
Respondent is Head of household (%) 
Respondent living in the village since birth (%) 
Average number of family members (Min-Max) 
Average number of adults (Min-Max) 
Average number of children (Min-Max) 
Average number of males at work (Min-Max) 
Type of Wall used for dwelling at present (%) 
 
 
 
 
Type of Roof used for dwelling at present (%)  
 
 
 
 
Nature of House in past (%) 
Floors of House at present (%) 
 
Tenure of Residence (%) 
 
Elevation status of the house (%) 
 
 
Size of homestead (Mean in hectare) 
Type of latrine (%) 
 
 
Source of drinking water – multiple responses 
(%) 
 
 
 
 
Percentage with electricity connection 
Percentage with access to cell phone  
Average household income (US $ /year) 
Main source of energy- multiple responses (%) 
 
 
Male 
Female 
Illiterate 
Primary School 
High School 
Farmer 
Fisherman 
Trader 
Service  
Wage worker 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Katcha/ Earthen 
Tin/ C.I. Sheet 
Pacca (brick) 
Wood 
Jhupri/ Chon 
Katcha/ Earthen 
Tin/ C.I. Sheet 
Pacca (brick) 
Wood 
Jhupri/ Chon 
Same 
Ground floor 
Up to first floor 
Rented 
Owned 
High land 
Mid land 
Low land 
 
Sanitary 
Ring/slab 
Katcha 
Deep Tube well 
Tube well 
Pond/ River 
Rain water  
Filtered Pond 
 
 
 
 
Wood/ Coal 
Twigs/ Leafs 
42.89 
84.09 
15.91 
7.83 
52.07 
26.73 
24.09 
6.82 
15.91 
6.36 
35.91 
81.36 
91.82 
4.97 (1-11) 
3.68 (1-10) 
1.89 (1-7) 
1.33 (1-4) 
18.26 
21.46 
9.13 
37.44 
10.50 
0.46 
73.97 
2.28 
4.57 
18.72 
52.51 
90.91 
9.09 
3.67 
89.45 
6.82 
37.27 
55.91 
0.13 ha 
7.73 
83.18 
9.55 
0.45 
12.27 
67.73 
48.64 
24.09 
 
21.46 
48.18 
815.47 
93.52 
83.80 
41.69 
71.79 
28.21 
8.36 
45.45 
27.27 
39.78 
7.17 
13.26 
6.45 
11.93 
63.08 
90.68 
5.66 (0-25) 
4.43 (1-15) 
1.72 (1-10) 
1.55 (1-7) 
5.02 
46.58 
11.42 
42.92 
17.35 
1.07 
80.71 
1.79 
2.50 
13.93 
74.29 
78.85 
21.15 
3.94 
92.11 
5.00 
41.07 
53.93 
0.14 ha 
21.94 
64.03 
12.95 
26.43 
33.57 
31.79 
15.36 
11.79 
 
31.79 
45.16 
857.19 
98.55 
61.82 
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Table 3: Summary statistics of the Key variables used for Regression Analysis 
 
Variable Definition No. of 
observations 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
L(DAMAGE) Log of the nominal value of Cyclone Sidr inflicted damages (in Tk.) 493 10.885 1.1381 
L(PREINC) Log of Pre-Cyclone Sidr HH Income (in Tk.) 449 11.569 1.079 
L(PREINC2) Square of the log of Pre-Cyclone Sidr HH Income (in Tk.) 449 135.02 25.28 
L(POSTINC) Log of Post-Cyclone Sidr HH Income (in Tk.) 489 10.648 1.262 
L(POSTINC2) Square of the log of Post-Cyclone Sidr HH Income (in Tk.) 489 114.96 24.44 
AREA Area of homestead, crop land, and the pond (in decimal)  500 142.6 24.441 
DCOAST Distance from the coast (in Km.) 500 44.10 18.248 
AGE Age of the respondent (in years) 497 42.221 13.252 
EDUYR Average years of respondent education 492 6.868 3.643 
CREDIT If household has access to credit (=1, 0 otherwise) 492 0.5752 0.4948 
MEMBER If household is a member of village level organizations (=1, 0 otherwise)  486 0.1934 0.3954 
MFRATIO Male/ Female ratio of the household 498 1.248 0.7933 
CHILDREN Number of children in the household 500 1.26 1.1896 
LOCCLE  If household house is always exposed to major storm given its location (=1, 0 otherwise) 498 0.032 0.177 
HELEV2 If household falls into medium elevation area (=1, 0 otherwise) 500 0.394 0.4891 
HELEV3 If household falls into high elevation area (=1, 0 otherwise 500 0.058 0.2339 
MIGRATION If planning to migrate in the future (=1, 0 otherwise) 494 0.328 0.469 
ELEC If household has access to electricity (=1, 0 otherwise) 499 0.273 0.4457 
PHONE If household has access to phone (=1, 0 otherwise)  499 0.465 0.4993 
PROTECTED If household falls into the mangrove protected area (=1, 0 otherwise) 500 0.44 0.497 
MDIST Distance between the union and the mangrove forest (in km.) 500 7.536 7.981 
MDIR If household is located to the south or the  southwest direction relative to the coast and the 
Sundarban mangrove forest (=1, 0 otherwise) 
500 0.548 0.498 
EMB If household is protected by the embankment (=1, 0 otherwise) 497 0.6097 0.4883 
ARELIEF If household has access to relief (=1, 0 otherwise) 499 0.8938 0.3084 
AREHABN If household has access to rehabilitation (=1, 0 otherwise) 492 0.5508 0.4979 
SURGEHT Approximate average Cyclone Sidr induced Storm surge height (in meter) 500 3.982 0.7085 
STORMEXP If household falls into counter-clockwise direction from Cyclone Sidr (=1, 0 otherwise) 500 0.42 0.4941 
STORMDIS Directional Distance between Household and the Track for the Cyclone Sidr (in km)  500 15.839 10.124 
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Table 4: Full information maximum likelihood (FIML) of the sample selection model for 
participation (selection) in ex-ante self-protection: Sample includes the entire study area 
a 
 
Selection Equation (dependent variable is the probability of households participating in ex-ante self-protection) 
Variable 
 (1)   (2)  (3)  (4) 
Coeff. Marg. Eff. Coeff. Marg. Eff. Coeff. Marg. Eff. Coeff.  Marg. Eff.  
CONSTANT -15.568 
(-1.98)** 
 -16.554 
(-2.08)** 
 -16.843 
(-2.00)** 
 -14.660 
(-1.76)** 
 
L(DAMAGE) 0.1768 
(2.44)*** 
0.0477 0.1978 
(2.66)*** 
0.0523 0.2128 
(2.74)*** 
0.0536 0.1899 
(2.43)*** 
0.0466 
L(PREINC) 2.084 
(1.59)* 
0.5617 2.325 
(1.76)** 
0.6135 2.391 
(1.70)** 
0.6024 1.956 
(1.41)* 
0.4801 
L(PREINC2) -0.0857 
(-1.55)* 
-0.0231 -0.095 
(-1.71)** 
-0.0251 -0.0968 
(-1.63)* 
-0.0244 -0.0794 
(-1.36)* 
-0.0195 
AREA 0.0006 
(2.33)*** 
0.0001 0.0006 
(2.03)** 
0.0001 0.0005 
(1.83)** 
-0.0019 0.0006 
(1.75)** 
0.0001 
DCOAST 0.0114 
(2.90)*** 
0.0031 0.0014 
(0.19) 
0.0004 0.0063 
(0.80) 
0.0016 0.0074 
(0.74) 
0.0018 
AGE -0.0022 
(-0.39) 
-0.0006 -0.0041 
(-0.72) 
-0.0011 -0.0076 
(-1.25) 
-0.0019 -0.0079 
(-1.26) 
-0.0019 
LOCCLE 0.2067 
(0.55) 
0.0604 0.0014 
(0.00) 
0.0004 -0.3833 
(-0.98) 
-0.08 -0.3487 
(-0.85) 
-0.0719 
EDUYR 0.0155 
(0.70) 
0.0042 0.0111 
(0.49) 
0.0029 0.0081 
(0.35) 
0.0020 0.0094 
(0.39) 
0.0023 
CREDIT -0.2543 
(-1.63)** 
-0.0696 -0.3426 
(-2.12)** 
-0.0923 -0.4249 
(-2.52)*** 
-0.1097 -0.4291 
(-2.48)*** 
-0.1080 
MEMBER 0.2653 
(1.37)* 
0.0763 0.2216 
(1.09) 
0.0618 0.3358 
(1.58)* 
0.0925 0.2864 
(1.29)* 
0.0761 
CHILD -0.1209 
(-1.77)** 
-0.0326 -0.1243 
(-1.74)** 
-0.0328 -0.1293 
(-1.63)** 
-0.0326 -0.1184 
(-1.40)* 
-0.0291 
ELEC 0.0167 
(0.10) 
0.0045 0.11 
(0.64) 
0.0297 0.1526 
(0.88) 
0.0397 0.1747 
(0.95) 
0.0446 
PHONE -0.3537 
(-2.28)** 
-0.095 -0.3107 
(-2.00)** 
-0.0817 -0.3589 
(-2.30)** 
-0.0901 -0.3236 
(-1.92)** 
-0.0792 
HELEV2 0.2783 
(1.75)** 
0.0774 0.2791 
(1.70)** 
0.0759 0.1666 
(0.97) 
0.0429 0.1308 
(0.68) 
0.0327 
HELEV3 0.2539 
(0.81) 
0.075 0.1936 
(0.60) 
0.0549 0.289 
(0.87) 
0.0815 0.4260 
(1.25) 
0.1233 
MIGRATION -0.073 
(-0.45) 
-0.0195 -0.2386 
(-1.35)* 
-0.0605 -0.2605 
(-1.46)* 
-0.0627 -0.2093 
(-0.98) 
-0.0495 
PROTECTED   0.5425 
(1.62)* 
0.1463 0.3569 
(1.05) 
0.0914 -0.6388 
(-1.25) 
-0.1519 
MDIST   -0.0315 
(-1.32)* 
-0.0083 -0.0299 
(-1.18) 
-0.0075 -0.0486 
(-1.81)** 
-0.0119 
MDIR   -0.4869 
(-1.51)* 
-0.1275 -0.4535 
(-1.33)* 
-0.1136 -0.5583 
(-1.61)* 
-0.1361 
EMB     -0.2133 
(-1.04) 
-0.0548 -0.270 
(-1.02) 
-0.068 
ARELEIF     -0.4091 
(-1.55)* 
-0.1189 -0.3663 
(-1.34)* 
-0.1028 
AREHABN     0.3635 
(2.02)** 
0.0902 0.2299 
(1.21) 
0.0559 
SURGEHT      
 
 0.2925 
(1.40)* 
0.0718 
STORMEXP      
 
 -0.7539 
(-1.92)** 
-0.1713 
STORMDIS      
 
 0.0342 
(3.15)*** 
0.0084 
a Z-tests are shown in parentheses beneath coefficient estimates. Significance levels: ***1%, **5%, *10%. 
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Table 5: Full information maximum likelihood (FIML) of the sample selection model for the 
outcome in self-protection conditional on participation: Sample includes the entire study area 
a,b 
Outcome Equation (dependent variable is the level of household ex-ante self-protection expenses (in Tk.) conditional on 
participation in self-protection activities) 
Variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Coeff. Marginal 
Effect 
Coeff. Marginal 
Effect 
Coeff. Marginal 
Effect 
Coeff. Marginal 
Effect 
CONSTANT 5012499 
(2.61)*** 
 4824857 
(2.36)*** 
 2950481 
(1.47)* 
 2777406 
(1.33)* 
 
L(DAMAGE) 31414.17 
(2.09)** 
44923.1 24557.77 
(1.57)* 
40554.6 29679.57 
(1.88)** 
49160.5 31806.89 
(1.95)** 
45494.81 
L(PREINC) -935330.2 
(-3.01)*** 
-776090.8 -899233.7 
(-2.75)*** 
-711072.6 -575624.9 
(-1.75)** 
-356740.2 -521966 
(-1.56)* 
-374203.1 
L(PREINC2) 42147.74 
(3.20)*** 
35599.76 40958.9 
(2.96)*** 
33272.25 26576.42 
(1.89)** 
17713.34 24181.45 
(1.69)** 
18158.33 
AGE 449.59 
(0.45) 
281.23 546.27 
(0.56) 
211.068 -42.049 
(-0.04) 
-736.54 -242.53 
(-0.26) 
-701.92 
EDUYR -2545.32 
(-0.62) 
-1361.56 -5409.89 
(-1.27) 
-4507.78 -4036.27 
(-0.95) 
-3293.11 -3939.07 
(-0.93) 
-3537.97 
CREDIT 60455.59 
(2.05)** 
41081.37 68927.8 
(2.29)** 
41332.78 84707.43 
(2.73)*** 
45990.64 71259.19 
(2.29)** 
42720.4 
MEMBER -57153.8 
(-1.57)* 
-37143.19 -52587.16 
(-1.36)* 
-34848.24 -61786.5 
(-1.55)* 
-31531.49 -49364.74 
(-1.20) 
-34437 
HELEV2 -50837.99 
(-1.63)* 
-29703.08 -58545.41 
(-1.90)** 
-36105.7 -61397.25 
(-1.92)** 
-46199.14 -47904.82 
(-1.66)** 
-40963.73 
HELEV3 -55360.76 
(-1.01) 
-36327.12 -81923.15 
(-1.50)* 
-66475.8 -121005.4 
(-2.11)** 
-95085.01 -91877.5 
(-1.54)* 
-68853.65 
PROTECTED   68426.17 
(1.51)* 
112066.5 114195.1 
(2.29)** 
146762.2 145357.8 
(1.50)* 
105508.6 
MDIST   1065.49 
(0.30) 
-1486.69 1483.77 
(0.41) 
-1255.26 -158.71 
(-0.04) 
-3278.65 
MDIR   -34526.22 
(-0.68) 
-73922.3 -48006.21 
(-0.96) 
-89521.16 -67997.52 
(-1.40)* 
-103706.2 
EMB     92285.14 
(2.20)** 
72824.25 117533.6 
(2.06)** 
101743.1 
ARELEIF     -21934.62 
(-0.41) 
-58372.31 -44006.35 
(-0.86) 
-69109.94 
AREHABN     -17993.46 
(-0.54) 
-15334.42 -3048.42 
(-0.10) 
12152.6 
SURGEHT       -42107.52 
(-1.04) 
-25373.06 
STORMEXP       24155.5 
(0.31) 
-25939.13 
STORMDIS       -1273.51 
(-0.49) 
1265.82 
RHO -0.700009  
(-4.07)*** 
-0.7477589 
(-4.21)*** 
-0.8336851 
(-6.20)*** 
-0.7919759 
(-3.90)*** 
SIGMA 138735.6 
(6.25)*** 
136971.7 
(5.41)*** 
137969.1 
(5.27)*** 
129815.8 
(4.45)*** 
LOG LIKE. -1308.99 -1300.28 -1229.22 -1222.58 
LR test (=0)  5.16** (2=1)
    
 4.12* (2=1)
    
 6.14** (2=1)
    
 3.65 (2=1)
    
 
LR test (prob>2) 0.0231 0.0425 0.000 0.0560 
CENS. OBS. 315 315 309 309 
a Under FIML, the LR stat to test independence between the error terms of the participation and outcome equations provide 
strong evidence against the null in all cases. That is, we reject the null or accept the dependence between the error terms.  
b  Z-tests are shown in parentheses beneath coefficient estimates. Significance levels: ***1%, **5%, *10%.  
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Table 6: Probit and Tobit Model for Ex-post Self-insurance  
Variable 
Probit Model a  
(dependent variable is the probability of households 
participating in self-insurance) 
Tobit Model b  
(dependent variable is the level of household ex-post 
self-insurance expenditures in Taka) 
(1) (2)  (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CONSTANT -5.556 
(-2.22)** 
-5.448 
(-2.04)** 
-6.683 
(-2.35)*** 
-5.766 
(-1.92)** 
387428.9 
(3.53)*** 
388326.1 
(3.52)*** 
357000.4 
(3.20)*** 
428488.2 
(3.56)*** 
L(DAMAGE) 0.0923 
(1.50)* 
0.0832 
(1.33)* 
0.0730 
(1.07) 
0.0543 
(0.79) 
9793.67 
(3.26)*** 
9584.08 
(3.24)*** 
10291.85 
(3.44)*** 
10127.24 
(3.37)*** 
L(POSTINC) 0.6360 
(1.31) 
0.6619 
(1.29)* 
0.6617 
(1.23) 
0.6649 
(1.22) 
-130195.5 
(-6.13)*** 
-130509.5 
(-6.21)*** 
-129021.6 
(-6.13)*** 
-131729.7 
(-6.25)*** 
L(POSTINC2) -0.0307 
(-1.24) 
-0.0315 
(-1.20) 
-0.0284 
(-1.04) 
-0.0280 
(-1.01) 
7267.94 
(6.64)*** 
7243.68 
(6.67)*** 
7180.74 
(6.60)*** 
7329.67 
(6.73)*** 
AREA 0.00002 
(0.06) 
-0.00008 
(-0.30) 
-0.00009 
(-0.38) 
-0.00013 
(-0.53) 
0.7022 
(0.06) 
-2.106 
(-0.17) 
-1.910 
(-0.15) 
-1.593 
(-0.13) 
DCOAST 0.0117 
(2.76)*** 
0.0211 
(2.72)*** 
0.0302 
(3.38)*** 
0.0238 
(2.15)** 
-46.081 
(-0.24) 
762.35  
(2.20)** 
886.99 
(2.34)*** 
447.89 
(0.95) 
AGE 0.0024 
(0.46) 
0.0032 
(0.60) 
0.0015 
(0.26) 
0.0025 
(0.42) 
432.58 
(1.74)** 
445.73 
(1.81)** 
424.28 
(1.69)** 
442.43 
(1.75)** 
EDUYR -0.0414 
(-1.85)** 
-0.0337 
(-1.47)* 
-0.0331 
(-1.35)* 
-0.0332 
(-1.35)* 
1498.51 
(1.47)* 
2183.19 
(2.13)** 
2349.95 
(2.29)** 
2365.25 
(2.31)** 
CREDIT 0.1359 
(0.96) 
0.2324 
(1.56)* 
0.1739 
(1.08) 
0.1742 
(1.07) 
3207.58 
(0.48) 
7940.03 
(1.18) 
9088.85 
(1.33)* 
8787.12 
(1.29)* 
MEMBER -0.4831 
(-2.36)*** 
-0.6923 
(-3.17)*** 
-0.8197 
(-3.50)*** 
-0.8227 
(-3.47)*** 
739.53 
(0.08) 
-6456.38 
(-0.70) 
-7200.24 
(-0.77) 
-6517.14 
(-0.70) 
CHILD 0.0952 
(1.59)* 
0.1159 
(1.87)** 
0.1503 
(2.31)** 
0.1584 
(2.39)*** 
13108.13 
(4.56)*** 
14150.84 
(4.95)*** 
14053.71 
(4.85)*** 
13571.03 
(4.65)*** 
MIGRATION 0.0248 
(0.16) 
0.0499 
(0.30) 
0.1028 
(0.56) 
0.1904 
(1.02) 
-4938.25 
(-0.68) 
2271.79 
(0.30) 
1944.53 
(0.25) 
2919.96 
(0.36) 
ELEC 0.3372 
(2.02)** 
0.3885 
(2.23)** 
0.4097 
(2.20)** 
0.4221 
(2.23)** 
-2779.96 
(-0.35) 
-5137.66 
(-0.63) 
-5726.66 
(-0.70) 
-7504.53 
(-0.90) 
HELEV2 -0.0042 
(-0.03) 
-0.1881 
(-1.17) 
-0.1784 
(-1.04) 
-0.1803 
(-0.99) 
-8206.32 
(-1.18) 
-15536.18 
(-2.18)** 
-15403.54 
(-2.11)** 
-11114.02 
(-1.41)* 
HELEV3 0.2806 
(0.94) 
0.2349 
(0.77) 
0.4257 
(1.29)* 
0.5306 
(1.56)* 
-16811.23 
(-1.10) 
-17389.07 
(-1.15) 
-15976.48 
(-1.04) 
-12461.09 
(-0.80) 
PROTECTED  -0.7958 
(-2.51)*** 
-1.289 
(-3.68)*** 
-1.117 
(-2.31)** 
 -56169.82 
(-3.76)*** 
-52976.78 
(-3.46)*** 
-48332.69 
(-2.32)*** 
MDIST  -0.0499 
(-2.09)** 
-0.0572 
(-2.15)** 
-0.0553 
(-1.98)** 
 -1748.22 
(-1.62)* 
-2113.72 
(-1.87)** 
-2014.65 
(-1.70)** 
MDIR  0.1043 
(0.32) 
-0.0557 
(-0.15) 
0.0201 
(0.05) 
 10926.43 
(0.74) 
5752.64 
(0.37) 
9379.12 
(0.59) 
EMB   -0.2765 
(-1.49)* 
-0.0289 
(-0.13) 
  12148.98 
(1.47)* 
17964.47 
(1.79)** 
ARELEIF   0.7493 
(2.24)** 
0.7314 
(2.18)** 
  12978.14 
(1.14) 
11824.92 
(1.04) 
AREHABN   0.9098 
(5.36)*** 
0.9161 
(5.30)*** 
  -6969.99 
(-0.95) 
-5460.13 
(-0.73) 
SURGEHT    -0.2876 
(-1.45)* 
   -10935.65 
(-1.29)* 
STORMEXP    0.0723 
(0.21) 
   -10575.4 
(-0.74) 
STORMDIS    0.0126 
(1.26) 
   -4.919 
(-0.01) 
Log Like. -222.30 -214.113 -188.25 -186.28 -3464.78 -3454.87 -3399.99 -3398.75 
LR Chi2  36.39   52.77  98.05  102.00 106.04  125.85  129.34  131.82  
OBS. 444 444 432 432 447 447 435 435 
a For the Probit model, Z-tests are shown in parentheses beneath coefficient estimates. Significance levels: ***1%, **5%, *10%.  
b For the Tobit model, t-tests are shown in parentheses beneath coefficient estimates. Significance levels: ***1%, **5%, *10%.  
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Table 7: Seemingly Bivariate Probit Model of Self-protection and Self-insurance 
a 
Variables Basic Model With Mangroves 
Characteristics 
With Public Programs With Storm Surge 
Characteristics 
SPROT SINSUR SPROT SINSUR SPROT SINSUR SPROT SINSUR 
CONSTANT -13.044 
(-1.73)** 
-5.295 
(-2.03)** 
-13.417 
(-1.73)** 
-5.126 
(-1.88)** 
-13.232 
(-1.59)* 
-7.407 
(-2.59)*** 
-10.777 
(-1.29)* 
-6.446 
(-2.15)** 
L(DAMAGE) 0.1479 
(2.11)** 
0.0850 
(1.32)* 
0.1716 
(2.36)*** 
0.0824 
(1.26) 
0.1953 
(2.55)*** 
0.1124 
(1.54)* 
0.1659 
(2.15)** 
0.1120 
(1.51)* 
L(PREINC) 1.757 
(1.40)* 
 1.892 
(1.47)* 
 1.868 
(1.34)* 
 1.298 
(0.93) 
 
L(PREINC2) -0.0706 
(-1.34)* 
 -0.0761 
(-1.41)* 
 -0.0752 
(-1.28)* 
 -0.0514 
(-0.88) 
 
L(POSTINC)  0.5997 
(1.18) 
 0.5944 
(1.13) 
 0.5725 
(1.07) 
 0.5604 
(1.04) 
L(POSTINC2)  -0.0302 
(-1.17) 
 -0.0300 
(-1.12) 
 -0.0255 
(-0.94) 
 -0.0235 
(-0.86) 
AREA 0.0006 
(2.27)** 
0.0005 
(1.55)* 
0.0006 
(1.92)** 
0.0004 
(1.17) 
0.0006 
(1.90)** 
0.0005 
(1.55)* 
0.0006 
(1.90)** 
0.0005 
(1.61)* 
DCOAST 0.0075 
(1.83)** 
0.0133 
(3.08)*** 
0.0069 
(0.89) 
0.0237 
(3.07)*** 
0.0086 
(1.00) 
0.0326 
(3.65)*** 
0.0136 
(1.32)* 
0.0251 
(2.29)** 
AGE -0.0027 
(-0.50) 
0.0029 
(0.55) 
-0.0037 
(-0.67) 
0.0034 
(0.63) 
-0.0059 
(-1.00) 
0.0004 
(0.07) 
-0.0068 
(-1.13) 
0.0015 
(0.25) 
EDUYR 0.0144 
(0.64) 
-0.0444 
(-1.94)** 
0.0122 
(0.53) 
-0.0383 
(-1.64)* 
0.0089 
(0.38) 
-0.0439 
(-1.75)** 
-0.0088 
(-0.36) 
-0.0441 
(-1.76)** 
CREDIT -0.2127 
(-1.44)* 
0.2229 
(1.50)* 
-0.2784 
(-1.82)** 
0.2637 
(1.72)** 
-0.3500 
(-2.18)** 
0.1789 
(1.08) 
-0.3489 
(-2.13)** 
0.1643 
(0.98) 
MFRATIO -0.1262 
(-1.29)* 
-0.0163 
(-0.18) 
-0.1009 
(-1.03) 
-0.0289 
(-0.31) 
-0.1160 
(-1.13) 
0.0053 
(0.05) 
-0.1296 
(-1.22) 
0.0285 
(0.27) 
CHILD -0.1307 
(-1.92)** 
0.0651 
(1.09) 
-0.1463 
(-2.09)** 
0.0779 
(1.27) 
-0.1724 
(-2.31)** 
0.1070 
(1.65)** 
-0.1519 
(-1.95)** 
0.0988 
(1.50)* 
ELEC -0.1023 
(-0.58) 
0.3626 
(2.16)** 
-0.0237 
(-0.13) 
0.3858 
(2.20)** 
0.0282 
(0.15) 
0.4318 
(2.29)** 
0.0944 
(0.49) 
0.4063 
(2.14)** 
PHONE -0.2920 
(-1.83)** 
-0.1279 
(-0.81) 
-0.3075 
(-1.90)** 
-0.1686 
(-1.06) 
-0.3701 
(-2.19)** 
-0.3246 
(-1.90)** 
-0.3217 
(-1.80)** 
-0.3036 
(-1.74)** 
PROTECTED   0.1231 
(0.39) 
-0.6596 
(-2.16)** 
0.0526 
(0.16) 
-0.9193 
(-2.76)*** 
-0.9809 
(-1.99)** 
-0.3422 
(-0.70) 
MDIST   -0.0516 
(-2.12)** 
-0.0415 
(-1.76)** 
-0.0424 
(-1.67)** 
-0.0378 
(-1.48)* 
-0.0638 
(-2.38)*** 
-0.0284 
(-1.05) 
MDIR   -0.5943 
(-1.82)** 
-0.0725 
(-0.22) 
-0.4897 
(-1.41)* 
-0.1886 
(-0.53) 
-0.6559 
(-1.85)** 
-0.0895 
(-0.24) 
EMB     -0.1584 
(-0.79) 
-0.1362 
(-0.71) 
-0.2225 
(-0.86) 
0.0925 
(0.37) 
ARELEIF     -0.3935 
(-1.57)* 
1.179 
(2.58)*** 
-0.3161 
(-1.20) 
1.163 
(2.52)*** 
AREHABN     0.3546 
(2.03)** 
0.9375 
(5.19)*** 
0.1825 
(0.98) 
1.0021 
(5.41)*** 
SURGEHT       0.3665 
(1.85)** 
-0.3435 
(-1.78)** 
STORMEXP       -0.7162 
(-1.91)** 
0.2576 
(0.75) 
STORMDIS       0.0386 
(3.61)*** 
-0.0044 
(-0.43) 
LOG LIKE. (OBS) -401.978 (402) -392.845 (402) -355.536 (392) -345.119 (392) 
Wald 2  (df) 52.89 (26) 67.86 (32) 102.95(38) 116.71 (44) 
LR test  0   2 (1)  = 4.607
** 2
(1) =4.128
** 2
(1) =2.273
* 2
(1) = 2.971
* 
a Dependent variables are the probability of households participating jointly in self-protection and self-insurance activities. Z-tests 
are shown in parentheses beneath coefficient estimates. Significant levels: ***1%, **5%, *10%. 
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1
 We assume that the self-protection or self-insurance actions of the household have no positive or negative 
externality impact on other households. This suggests that the household cannot transfer the consequences of its self-
protection or self-insurance actions to others.    
2
 For ease of exposition, we omit the household index  i and the village index j  in the following steps.    
3
 Hiebert (1983) introduced the terms ‘stochastic substitutes’ and ‘stochastic complements’ to define the 
relationships between technological inputs to reduce risks of a competitive firm facing production uncertainty. 
Archer et al. (2006) later applied the same terms to sign their comparative static results under the endogenous risk 
framework to study a parent’s child care choices among alternative childcare technologies when the child could be 
exposed to some environmental hazard.  
4
 Although the Sundarban may have offered protection to many coastal communities, Cyclone Sidr also severely 
affected approximately 30,000 acres of forest resources while partially affected another 80,000 acres in the southeast 
Sundarban, thus causing estimated forest damages of US $ 145 million (GOB, 2008). 
5
 We selected the area based on the Saffir-Simpson tropical storm intensity scale developed by the UN Office for the 
Coordination of Human Affairs (OCHA).  Areas on the southwest coast and the entire Sundarban mangrove forest 
fall under the high risk zone. The map illustrating this division is available from the authors upon request. 
6 The term ‘union’ refers to the lowest administrative unit in the rural areas of Bangladesh.  Administratively, 
Bangladesh has 6 divisions, 64 zilas, 508 upazilas and 4466 unions (Source: Statistical Pocketbook of Bangladesh, 
2009).  Under the Village Chaukidari Act of 1870, villages were grouped into unions to provide for a system of 
watches and wards in each village. 
7
 Besides performing full information maximum likelihood (FIML) method on our full sample following the 
Heckman model, we also performed separate regressions for the two-part model. Since most of the results remain 
unchanged under the two-part model compared to the Heckman model, we decided to report the most significant and 
robust specification results using FIML in Table 4.       
8
 To test H1, we use actual damages inflicted by Cyclone Sidr as a proxy for expected damages, as our survey 
occurred in the year following the storm. Although our survey was able to recover households’ estimates of self-
protection actions and expenditures that they undertook before the storm and their self-insurance measures 
immediately after the storm, it proved too difficult in such an ex-post survey to obtain the households’ estimates of 
their expected damages from Cyclone Sidr.   
9
 The likelihood ratio test (LR test) for the correlation between the error terms of the two equations for all 
regressions except the basic regression 1 suggests that the Heckman two-step method is preferred to the two-part 
model. However, taking into account the possible collinearity between the inverse Mills ratio and other regressors, 
we also considered the two-part model as an alternative regression specification. Results from the two-part model 
are similar, except that none of the mangroves variables are statistically significant. The regressions from the two-
part model are available from the authors upon request.   
10
 Using the damage function approach and secondary data from the 1999 Super Cyclone in Orissa, Das and Vincent 
(2009) show the possible storm protection role of mangroves in saving lives and property.  Barbier (2007) employs 
an expected damage function approach to estimate the value of mangroves in protecting against coastal storms 
across provinces in Thailand over 1996-2004. 
11
 There is a distinction between the expected utility stated in equation (3) and the expected utility stated in equation 
(A.1). In equation (3), we substituted for X (i.e. the composite good) considering the income constraint. Thus, the 
choice variables for equation (4) are Z  and A . But for the maximization problem with constraints in equation (A.1), 
we do not perform any substitution since we are interested in the Kuhn-Tucker conditions in order to explain the 
household behavioral responses to private storm protection strategies (i.e. the four types). Thus, for this case, the 
choice variables are Z , A , and X . 
12
 Hiebert (1983) introduced the terms ‘stochastic substitutes’ and ‘stochastic complements’ to define the 
relationships between technological inputs to reduce risks of a competitive firm facing production uncertainty. 
Archer et al. (2006) later applied the same terms to sign their comparative static results under the endogenous risk 
framework to study a parent’s child care choices among alternative childcare technologies when the child could be 
exposed to some environmental hazard.  
